The Reasons for the AKP's Strong Commitment to the EU Process

When Domestic Meets With International:

The Political Transformation of Turkey, 1997-2004

Engin I. Erdem, Florida International Univ.

Social Science Research Network

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The Reasons for the AKP’s Strong Commitment to the EU Process

The Council’s decision to open the negotiations with Turkey clearly represents a major turning point in the history of Turkey-EU relations. The decision also gratified the AKP government’s strong commitment to the EU cause. The AKP leader Erdogan’s tour of Europe following the November 3 elections, the adoption of four EU harmonization law packages in 2003, the 2004 May constitutional amendment, the adoption of a new penal code in September 2004, the workings of the reform follow-up group to ensure the effective implementation of legislative changes can be considered to be major indications for such a commitment. Moreover, the Copenhagen European Council of December 12-13, 2002, and the Commission’s regular reports for 2003-2004 acknowledged the firm determination of the AKP government to undertake democratization and human rights reforms on the path of EU membership. Furthermore, several pro-EU statements made by the AKP leaders, Erdogan and Gul, the AKP’s party program (entitled “Development and Democratization”), and the AKP’s government program indicated the party’s strong commitment to the prospective of EU membership.75

The critical question here is to explain why the AKP had such a commitment. The question deserves attention particularly when one considers that Erdogan’s AKP has substantially differed from Erdogan’s past as a proponent of political Islam. The AKP was founded on August 14, 2001 following the closure of the Virtue Party (FP-Fazilet Partisi) by the constitutional court on June 22, 2001.76 The Virtue Party had been established after the ban on the Welfare Party (RP-Refah Partisi) by the court on January 16, 1998. Violation of the principle of secularism was the major reason for the constitutional court to close the FP and RP.77 Like the previous two parties, the National Order Party (MNP-Milli Nizam Partisi, 1970-71) and the National Salvation Party (MSP-Milli Selamet Partisi, 1972-1980), the FP and RP were representatives of Necmettin Erbakan’s National View Movement (MGH-Milli Görüş Hareketi). The movement has constituted the center of political Islam in Turkey over the past three decades. Overall, it had a religious and nationalist perspective on politics and society. It also had uneasy relations with Turkey’s secular regime and the West. Erbakan, the leader of the movement, has defined the European Union/Community as a “Christian Club”, and gave priority to the Muslim world in Turkish foreign policy. Overall, Erbakan’s movement has had a very antagonistic approach to the West including Europe.

Like Erbakan, the AKP leaders Erdogan and Gul had anti-Western views until the late 1990s. For example, Gul, the key figure behind the recent reforms on the path of EU membership, was arguing against the EU membership in March 1995 when he was a member of the parliament from the Welfare Party. In a parliamentary session concerning the Customs Union agreement between Turkey and the EU, he harshly criticized the agreement in particular, and the EU in general. The following part from his speech shows that Gul (and his party) had a very antagonistic, essentialist and homogenizing view of Europe/EU at that time:

It’s certain that Turkey will not enter into the European Union; that has been said by Europeans; by all prominent European politicians. All European philosophers have said that, because the European Union is a Christian Union. We are not saying that: that has been said by Delors who was the head of the European Union in the past, has been said by ex-British prime minister, that has been said by all Europeans, everybody knows that.78

The Welfare Party came into power following the December 24, 1995 elections. With 21.4 percent of votes, the party won 158 seats out of 550 making it the parliament’s largest political party. It formed a coalition government (Refah-Yol) with the True Path Party (DYP). The Refah-Yol coalition, led by Necmettin Erbakan, was ousted from power through the indirect military intervention of “the 28 February process”. The Turkish military forced Erbakan’s government to implement eighteen decrees regarding the secular character of the regime by a statement announced by the National Security Council on February 28, 1997.79 The Turkish generals considered that Erbakan’s party a threat against Turkey’s secular regime due to its ‘Islamist’ character. Along with the 28 February statement, the military followed a political campaign, including the press, business and ‘civil society’ to end the Refah-Yol coalition.80 Under heavy pressure from the military, Erbakan resigned on June 18, 1997.81 On January 16, 1998, the constitutional court decided to close the Welfare Party, and banned Erbakan from politics for five years. The end of Refah-Yol government and the closure of RP demonstrated the limits of political Islam in Turkey’s secular system.

The 28 February process and its aftermath have resulted in important transformations among the Turkish Islamists. On the one hand, ‘traditionalist Islamists’ have continued to follow a religious and nationalist line. They also have had very skeptical views about the West and the European Union.82 The Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi), that was established following the closure of Virtue Party, represents this group of Islamists. The party has widely remained in the shadow of Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of National View Movement. ‘Innovationist/reformist Islamists’ including R. Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah Gul, on the other hand, have had different reflections on the 28 February process (Cizre and Çınar 2003: 322-328).

First, they have had a more pluralistic and liberal view of democracy in contrast to the instrumentalist approach. Now, democracy is no longer a means to reach an Islamic ‘just order’, rather, it has been considered as an intrinsically good system of government. 83 Second, the reformist wing has reconciled with Turkey’s secular system to a great extent. The Justice and Development Party, founded by Erdogan and Gul in August 2001, has always refuted the ‘Islamist’ label for their party.84 Rather, they have argued that the AKP is a ‘conservative democratic party’ that attributes great importance to pluralist democracy, human rights, civil society, fundamental rights and freedoms, traditional values and family.85 Third, the ‘reformist Islamists’ fundamentally changed their views about the European Union (Duran 2004: 131-135, Dagi 2001: 40-46). In contrast to the antagonistic views of the West and the EU in their past, they have begun to take European democracy and its human rights norms as points of reference for Turkey’s political reforms. It is particularly important that they have had strong commitment to Turkey’s prospective EU membership to have a better democracy in the country. For this reason, it is not a coincidence that the AKP’s party program of ‘Development and Democratization’ has widely converged with the EU’s Copenhagen criteria.86 Moreover, the AKP has viewed Turkey’s EU membership as the best case against the ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis.87 In other words, the party has attributed a strategic dimension to Turkey-EU relations in the context of peaceful and cooperative Islam-the West relations.88

The transformation of political Islam following the 28 February process has had a significant impact on the evolution of Turkey-EU relations during the period of the AKP’s majority government. Ideational changes caused by this process have led to the emergence of the conservative democratic party that has a strong commitment to the country’s bid for the EU membership. In contrast to the anti-Western, anti-European parties of the National View Movement such as the Welfare Party, Erdogan’s AKP has had such a commitment, and succeeded to launch the accession negotiations with the EU following the impressive reforms accomplished in 2002-2004. The AKP case presents a good example to show how ideational changes at the domestic level could have substantial foreign policy consequences.

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Although ideational changes in Turkey’s political Islamists in the aftermath of the 28 February process have been the key dynamic behind the AKP’s strong commitment to the EU membership, interest-related factors have also been relevant to a certain extent. First, a democratizing Turkey on the path of EU membership would provide the best guarantee for the political survival of ‘reformist Islamists’ represented by the AKP (Dagi 2001: 46, Tocci 2005: 80). The closure of four political parties of the National View Movement in the past three decades has demonstrated the limits of political Islam in a country where the highly secular military plays an active role in politics. Then, fulfillment of the EU’s Copenhagen criteria, which requires the democratic civilian-military relations, will enhance the power of AKP in the political system. Thus, the AKP’s strong commitment to the EU process has also been related to these concerns. Additionally, the EU related reforms are expected to ensure the full enjoyment of fundamental rights and liberties. It is particularly important that, the reforms concerning freedom of thought, expression and religion are essential to the AKP’s mostly pious and conservative voters. Finally, strong commitment to the EU process has provided a source of legitimacy for the AKP in the eyes of the military and other Westernist-secular elite in the country. (Tocci 2005: 80) That has been especially relevant for the first months following the November 3 elections. At that period, the AKP succeeded in overcoming the existing concerns about its ‘Islamist’ past by pursuing an active diplomacy before the Copenhagen European Council of December 12-13, to launch the accession negotiations. Summing up, all of these interest related factors have been remarkably relevant for the party’s strong commitment to the EU membership goal, along with the ideational changes mentioned earlier.

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Full-text is available at:

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1013126

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